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Of the unexplained characteristics of the 1918–19 
inﬂ   uenza pandemic, the extreme mortality rate among 
young adults (W-shaped mortality curve) is the foremost. 
Lack of a coherent explanation of this and other 
epidemiologic and clinical manifestations of the pandemic 
contributes to uncertainty in preparing for future pandemics. 
Contemporaneous records suggest that immunopathologic 
responses were a critical determinant of the high mortality 
rate among young adults and other high-risk subgroups. 
Historical records and ﬁ   ndings from laboratory animal 
studies suggest that persons who were exposed to 
inﬂ  uenza once before 1918 (e.g., A/H3Nx 1890 pandemic 
strain) were likely to have dysregulated, pathologic cellular 
immune responses to infections with the A/H1N1 1918 
pandemic strain. The immunopathologic effects transiently 
increased susceptibility to ultimately lethal secondary 
bacterial pneumonia. The extreme mortality rate associated 
with the 1918–19 pandemic is unlikely to recur naturally. 
However, T-cell–mediated immunopathologic effects should 
be carefully monitored in developing and using universal 
inﬂ  uenza vaccines.
T
he inﬂ   uenza pandemic of 1918–19 was the most 
deadly single event in recorded history. Because of 
its unique severity and global effects, it is the prototype 
of a global natural disaster. In recent years, fears of 
recurrence of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic similar to that in 1918 
have motivated planning, preparations, and allocations of 
resources by public health and other government agencies, 
nongovernmental organizations, medical care providers, 
pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers, medical 
researchers, private businesses, and persons worldwide (1).
Because of severe consequences and current relevance 
of the 1918 pandemic, it is essential to review its events 
and effects, determine their underlying causes, and assess 
likelihood of a recurrence. These tasks are difﬁ  cult because 
the 1918 pandemic occurred at the end of World War I, 
before inﬂ   uenza viruses were discovered and before 
inﬂ   uenza vaccines, antiviral and antibacterial drugs, 
and intensive medical care were available. Fortunately, 
abundant and detailed written records exist of clinical, 
laboratory, and epidemiologic events during the pandemic 
period (2–6). In addition, isolates of the virus that caused 
the lethal second wave of the pandemic (in the fall of 1918 
in most locations) have been reconstructed from preserved 
remains of patients who died (7). These isolates have been 
used to determine the genetic relationships between the 
1918 pandemic inﬂ  uenza strain and subsequent seasonal 
and pandemic A/H1N1 strains (8). Genetic relationships 
between the 1918 pandemic strain and strains that caused 
the clinically mild ﬁ  rst wave of epidemics in 1918 and 
pandemics before 1918 remain undeﬁ  ned (9–11).
It is commonly believed that the 1918 pandemic 
resulted from the sudden emergence and worldwide spread 
of an inherently hypervirulent inﬂ  uenza strain. However, 
this view is inconsistent with several well-documented 
characteristics of the pandemic. In this report, we review 
unique, poorly understood, or unexplained clinical and 
epidemiologic characteristics of the 1918 pandemic. Also, 
we present hypotheses that are scientiﬁ  cally  credible, 
consistent with the historical record, and account for 
epidemiologic and clinical manifestations of the pandemic. 
Finally, we discuss implications of our hypotheses 
regarding pandemic inﬂ  uenza preparedness and research 
and development of universal inﬂ  uenza vaccines (12).
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Unique and Unexplained Characteristics 
of the 1918 Pandemic
Mortality and Case-Fatality Rates
Because the 1918 pandemic spread worldwide and 
caused unprecedented numbers of deaths, it is often presumed 
that the pandemic strain was unusually transmissible and 
that infection with the virus was inherently lethal (i.e., 
direct effects of the virus routinely and rapidly caused 
death). During the 1918 pandemic, inﬂ  uenza  infection 
rates were similar to those during other pandemics of the 
last century; and in most affected populations, overall 
mortality rates were <1%, and case-fatality rates were <3% 
(4,13). Thus, the 1918 pandemic strain was not unusually 
transmissible compared with other pandemic strains (13); 
and even without deﬁ  nitive treatments (e.g., antiviral and 
antibacterial drugs) or modern life-preserving measures 
(e.g., mechanical ventilation, medical intensive care), most 
infected persons survived (10).
Deaths Caused by Secondary Bacterial Pneumonia
In 1918, most pandemic-related deaths were not 
caused by primary inﬂ  uenza-related pneumonia or acute 
respiratory distress syndrome, and relatively few deaths 
occurred within the ﬁ  rst few days after illness onset (11). 
Most deaths occurred >7 days after illness onset and 
were the result of secondary bacterial pneumonia caused 
by common colonizers of the respiratory tract, e.g., 
Haemophilus inﬂ  uenzae,  Streptococcus pneumoniae,  S. 
pyogenes, and Staphylococcus aureus ( 3–5,14). Clinical 
and pathologic records suggest that lethal secondary 
bacterial pneumonias often followed dysregulated immune 
responses to infections with inﬂ  uenza (15,16).
Increased Mortality Rate in Young Adults 
(W-shaped Mortality Curve)
In general, during the 1918–19 inﬂ  uenza pandemic 
period, illness rates were highest among children of school 
age. However, mortality rates were highest among infants, 
young adults, and the elderly (Figure) (17). The W-shaped 
relationship between mortality rate and age is a unique 
and unexplained characteristic of the 1918 pandemic. 
The lack of correspondence between illness and mortality 
rate in relation to age belies the common views that 
direct pathologic effects of the virus were independently 
and invariably life threatening and that the usual clinical 
course after infection was rapid deterioration of respiratory 
function terminating in death.
In 1889–90, pandemic inﬂ  uenza (Russian ﬂ  u) spread 
rapidly throughout the world, and from 1890 through the 
winter of 1900–01, widespread epidemics of inﬂ  uenza-
like illness recurred (4,18). The 1890–91 and subsequent 
epidemic waves likely were caused by variants of the 1889–
90 pandemic strain (19). Thus, before 1918, most members 
of the 1875–1900 birth cohorts had been exposed to the 
1889–90 pandemic inﬂ  uenza strain. These persons were 
18–43 years old, the age groups at highest mortality risk, 
during the lethal second wave of the 1918 pandemic (20).
Timing and Characteristics of Epidemic Waves
During 1918–19, three distinct inﬂ  uenza  epidemic 
waves occurred. The ﬁ   rst wave (mid-1918 in most 
locations) caused widespread illness but few deaths (3-day 
fever). The second wave (fall of 1918 in most locations) 
caused widespread illness and high mortality rates (14). 
The third wave (winter 1919) caused widespread illness 
but affected fewer persons and caused fewer deaths than 
the second wave.
The sharp contrast in the clinical expressions of 
infections during the ﬁ  rst and second waves suggests that 
they were caused by different inﬂ  uenza virus strains. If 
the ﬁ  rst 2 epidemic waves of the 1918–19 pandemic were 
caused by the same or immunologically cross-reactive 
inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses, persons affected during the 
ﬁ  rst wave should have been protected from infection and, 
in turn, illness, secondary pneumonia, and death during 
Figure. Illness attack rate (red line) and overall mortality 
rate (black line) for inﬂ   uenza-related pneumonia, by 
age groups of selected US populations, during the 
1918 inﬂ  uenza pandemic period.
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the second wave. Protection from infection would have 
derived from neutralizing antibodies against the same or 
similar viral surface antigens (e.g., hemagglutinin).
There are conﬂ  icting reports regarding the immunologic 
susceptibility to infection during the second wave among 
persons who were infected during the ﬁ  rst wave. Several 
reports of the experiences of localized groups (e.g., students, 
prisoners, military units) suggest that illness during the ﬁ  rst 
wave protected from inﬂ  uenza during the second wave (3,9). 
However, our review of the medical records of all persons 
who served in the Australian Imperial Forces in Europe and 
the Middle East in 1918 documents that persons affected 
during the ﬁ  rst wave were as likely to become ill, but were 
much less likely to die, from inﬂ  uenza–pneumonia during 
the second wave (12). Together, the ﬁ  ndings suggest that 
infections during the ﬁ  rst wave altered immune responses to 
the pandemic strain during the second wave. In turn, persons 
infected during the ﬁ  rst wave had milder clinical expressions 
and lower mortality rates when infected with the pandemic 
strain during the second wave.
Mortality Rates among Nurses and Medical Ofﬁ  cers
During the 1918 pandemic period, military nurses and 
medical ofﬁ  cers were intensively and repeatedly exposed 
to the inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) pandemic strain in clinics, in 
ambulances, and on crowded open wards. However, during 
the lethal second wave, nurses and medical ofﬁ  cers of the 
Australian Army had inﬂ  uenza-related illness rates similar 
to, but mortality rates lower than, any other occupational 
group (12). Similar observations were made in other groups 
of military and civilian health care workers (21). These 
ﬁ  ndings suggest that the occupational group with the most 
intensive exposure to the pandemic strain had relatively 
low inﬂ  uenza-related pneumonia mortality rates during the 
second wave (12).
Mortality Rates among Military Members 
with Least Service
During the fall of 1918, all 40 large mobilization/
training camps throughout the United States and Puerto 
Rico were affected by inﬂ  uenza epidemics (13,22). During 
the camp epidemics, inﬂ  uenza–pneumonia mortality rates 
were inevitably highest among the soldiers with the least 
military service. In the US Army overall, 60% of those who 
died of inﬂ  uenza-related pneumonia were soldiers with <4 
months of military service (13,14,22).
Among Australian soldiers in Europe and the Middle 
East in the fall of 1918, persons with the least military 
service also had the highest inﬂ  uenza-related pneumonia 
mortality rate (12). In general, in deployed Australian 
Army formations, soldiers were not segregated by time 
in military service. Thus, the nature or intensity of 
soldiers’ exposures to the pandemic strain likely did not 
vary in relation to their length of military service. During 
epidemics of the second wave, most soldiers were likely 
exposed to the same inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) strain, and most 
of those affected were treated in the same military medical 
system as their counterparts regardless of seniority. Thus, 
the sharp differences in mortality rates in relation to length 
of service, in mobilization camps in the United States and 
deployed settings in Europe, likely reﬂ  ected differences in 
host immune responses to the pandemic strain.
Mortality Rates among Passengers and 
Crews on US Troop Transport Ships
Inﬂ   uenza illness rates were similar on US troop 
transports. However, case-fatality rates were sharply higher 
among soldiers who had recently congregated on the ships 
than among permanently assigned crewmen (23).
Mortality Rates among Residents and 
Soldiers from Urban and Rural Areas
In the United States during the pandemic period, the 
inﬂ  uenza-related mortality rate was higher among residents 
of urban areas than among residents of rural areas. In 
contrast, the mortality rate was higher among soldiers from 
rural than among those from urban areas (24).
Mortality Rates among Island Populations
When pandemic inﬂ  uenza attacked island populations, 
mortality rates were often high, sometimes extraordinarily 
so, e.g., Western Samoa (22%) and Nauru (16%) (25–
28). However, some island populations had relatively 
low mortality rates during pandemic-related epidemics, 
e.g., the Philippines (1%), Puerto Rico (1%), and Hawaii 
(0.5%) (25,29). On other islands, mortality rates varied 
widely among different groups of island residents, e.g., 
Chamorrans (12%) versus Caroline Islanders (0.4%) on 
Saipan (26); indigenous Fijians (5.7%) versus Europeans 
(1.4%) on Fiji (4); and indigenous (Maori) (4.2%) versus 
European (0.5%) residents of New Zealand (30). Thus, 
on some islands, subgroups of residents who shared the 
same microbiological and environmental exposures had 
markedly different inﬂ   uenza-related mortality rates. 
Because the same inﬂ   uenza strain likely caused all 
pandemic-related island epidemics, the wide variability 
in mortality rates across island populations suggests that 
host immune factors were determinants (perhaps with other 
factors such as poverty, overcrowding, and malnutrition) 
of the clinical courses and outcomes of infections with the 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza strain.
Clinical Expression of Infections with 
Similar A/H1N1 Strains in 2009 and 1918
The 1918 inﬂ   uenza A (H1N1) pandemic strain is 
genetically similar to the novel pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
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strain. However, clinical expressions of infections in 2009 
were much less severe than in 1918, e.g., mortality rates in 
1918 were >100× higher than in 2009 (31).
Hypotheses
Unique and unexplained characteristics of the 1918 
pandemic suggest that the risk for lethal secondary 
bacterial pneumonia after inﬂ  uenza infections depended on 
the nature, timing, and intensity of immune responses to 
the pandemic strain; and subsequently on the likelihood of 
exposure during transient periods of increased susceptibility 
to bacterial strains against which affected persons had no 
protective antibodies. In 1918, nearly all humans were 
immunologically susceptible to infection with the A/H1N1 
pandemic strain; not surprisingly, the pandemic spread 
rapidly worldwide. The rapid spread of the pandemic with 
high illness attack rates in most age groups indicates that an 
inﬂ  uenza virus antigenically similar to the pandemic strain 
did not widely circulate among humans within at least 
several decades before 1918.
We hypothesize that in 1918 many persons had second 
lifetime exposures to an immunodominant T-cell epitope 
that was conserved on an internal protein of the 1918 
pandemic strain and a heterosubtypic other strain (e.g., 
1889 pandemic strain). When persons were reexposed to 
the identical epitope in 1918, epitope-speciﬁ  c  memory 
CD8+ T-cells produced excessive cytokines, chemokines, 
immune cell activation, and epithelial cell necrosis. The 
immunopathologic effects of the dysregulated T-cell 
response transiently increased susceptibility of infected 
hosts to respiratory bacterial strains against which they 
lacked protective antibodies.
In contrast, persons who were ﬁ  rst  exposed 
in 1918 to the immunodominant T-cell epitope of 
hypothesized concern may have had primary T-cell 
responses that controlled virus replication without 
increasing susceptibility to bacterial invasion of the 
lower respiratory tract. Persons who had multiple prior 
exposures to inﬂ   uenza viruses and other respiratory 
infectious agents before 1918 had diversely partitioned 
memory CD8+ T-cell repertoires and extensive portfolios 
of bacterial strain–speciﬁ   c antibodies. Their immune 
responses to infection with the 1918 pandemic strain may 
have controlled virus replication without increasing their 
susceptibility to bacterial invasion.
Modern genetic analyses have estimated that 3 distinct 
variants of inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses co-circulated in 
the early 1900s (8,32). These variants were the respective 
prototypes of all pandemic, seasonal, and classical swine 
inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses since 1918. The ﬁ  rst epidemic 
wave of the 1918 pandemic may have been the last wave 
of the 1889–90 Russian ﬂ  u pandemic. If so, the ﬁ  rst wave 
spread widely and rapidly in the face of background 
immunity to an inﬂ  uenza strain that had been circulating 
among humans for nearly 3 decades (4,18).
Alternatively, the ﬁ  rst wave may have been caused 
by an antigenically distinct seasonal strain of inﬂ  uenza 
A (H1N1) (8,32). If so, antibodies against hemagglutinin 
of the seasonal strain did not provide complete protection 
against infection with the pandemic strain. However, 
because many internal proteins of human inﬂ  uenza viruses 
are conserved and strongly immunogenic (e.g., matrix 
2, nucleoprotein [NP]), antibodies and memory CD8+ T 
lymphocytes that were produced during the ﬁ  rst wave may 
have altered clinical expressions, decreased susceptibility 
to secondary bacterial pneumonia, and reduced deaths 
during the second wave (33).
The peak of mortality rates among young adults 
(W-shaped mortality curve) remains a unique and 
unexplained characteristic of the 1918 pandemic (20). 
Before World War I, there was relatively little global 
interconnectedness. Even in the most industrialized 
countries, many persons lived their entire lives in their birth 
communities and had relatively little exposure to outsiders. 
The situation sharply and permanently changed with the 
social disruptions and population dislocations precipitated 
by worldwide armed conﬂ  ict.
Persons born before 1901 (the last year of widespread 
circulation of the 1890 Russian ﬂ  u pandemic strain) and 
after 1875 (the ﬁ  rst year after widespread epidemics of a 
poorly characterized inﬂ   uenza-like illness) were 18–43 
years of age in 1918. Worldwide, members of these birth 
cohorts had high inﬂ  uenza attack rates and were likely to 
die from secondary bacterial pneumonia during the 1918 
pandemic period (Figure).
Persons born before 1875 were >43 years of age in 
1918. Before the 1918 pandemic period, they likely had 
been exposed to more heterosubtypes of inﬂ  uenza  A 
and more respiratory bacterial strains than their younger 
counterparts. In general, during the pandemic period, 
middle-age and elderly adults had lower inﬂ  uenza attack 
rates and were less likely to die than their younger 
counterparts (Figure).
Also in 1918, persons born after 1901 were less likely 
than those older to have been exposed to the 1890 pandemic 
strain or displaced by war-related activities. During the 
pandemic period, persons <17 years of age had relatively 
high inﬂ  uenza attack rates but relatively low mortality rates 
(except for infants) (Figure).
We hypothesize that, soon after infection with 
the 1918 pandemic inﬂ   uenza strain, infected persons 
experienced a transient increase in susceptibility of the 
lower respiratory tract to invasion by bacteria to which 
they were immunologically naive. Thus, for example, 
those who were relatively new to their living or work 
environments (e.g., military recruits, soldiers on troop 
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ships, patients on hospital wards) at the time they were 
infected with the 1918 pandemic strain had a relatively 
high risk of death from secondary bacterial pneumonia 
(12). During the course of their inﬂ  uenza illnesses, such 
persons were likely to be exposed to bacterial strains to 
which they lacked protective antibodies (10). Thus, for 
example, residents of rural areas were relatively unlikely 
to be exposed to novel strains of bacteria while recovering 
from inﬂ   uenza, and they had low pandemic-related 
mortality rates. In contrast, military recruits from the 
same rural areas were likely to be exposed to novel strains 
of bacteria while recovering from inﬂ  uenza, and they had 
relatively high pandemic-related mortality rates (24).
This interpretation explicates the somewhat 
counterintuitive ﬁ  nding that nurses, medical ofﬁ  cers, and 
the crews of troop ships had high inﬂ  uenza attack rates 
but relatively low mortality rates during the lethal second 
wave of the 1918 pandemic. Before being infected with the 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza strain, these persons were often exposed 
in their occupational settings to high concentrations of 
diverse strains of respiratory infectious agents. Because 
of their extensive portfolios of respiratory bacteria strain–
speciﬁ   c antibodies, they were naturally immune to and 
protected from secondary pneumonia caused by these 
agents (12,23,24).
The hypotheses presented here are consistent with the 
historical record and scientiﬁ  cally plausible. For example, 
studies in humans have identiﬁ  ed an immunodominant NP-
derived CD8+ T-cell epitope that is consistently presented 
by high frequency HLA class I molecules and recognized 
by cytotoxic T lymphocytes. The epitope is present on the 
NP of the 1918, 1976, and 2009 human pandemic strains 
and on most swine strains, but not on most other human 
strains of the past century (34).
Studies in pigs suggest that the NP of most swine 
inﬂ  uenza strains contains a strongly immunogenic CD8+ 
T-cell epitope. For example, pigs that were primed with 
a DNA vaccine that expresses NP, and subsequently 
challenged with an inﬂ  uenza A strain with the same NP, 
had dysregulated, pathogenic immune responses (35). Also, 
pigs that were primed with an inactivated swine inﬂ  uenza A 
vaccine (A/swine/Iowa/15/1930 H1N1) and subsequently 
challenged with a later generation swine inﬂ  uenza  A 
strain with markedly different surface proteins (A/swine/
Minnesota/00194/2003 H1N2) showed development of 
enhanced (immunologically potentiated) pneumonia that 
were not observed after challenge with the homologous 
strain (36). The ﬁ  ndings have been reproduced by using 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus as the challenge strain and 
adding a recombinant matrix 2 protein to the vaccine 
construct (37).
Studies in mice have documented that T-cell–
mediated immunopathologic responses can contribute to 
severe pneumonitis when mice are exposed to a highly 
glycosylated inﬂ   uenza virus and subsequently infected 
with a poorly glycosylated strain. Infection with a recent 
seasonal inﬂ   uenza virus (H1N1), followed by infection 
with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, elicited severe 
immunopathogenic responses (38). Finally, studies 
in ferrets have documented that those infected with 
pneumococci after acquiring inﬂ   uenza, but not before, 
showed development of lethal secondary pneumonia and 
other invasive complications (39).
In summary, we hypothesize that mortality risk 
after infection with the 1918 pandemic inﬂ  uenza  A 
(H1N1) strain depended on the number, nature, and 
diversity of prior infections with inﬂ   uenza virus and 
respiratory bacteria. Speciﬁ  cally, mortality rates during 
the lethal second wave were highest among persons with 
prior exposures to heterosubtypic inﬂ  uenza strains that 
enhanced immunopathogenic effects when a person was 
infected with the 1918 pandemic strain and had limited 
exposures to other respiratory infectious agents. In such 
persons, infection with the pandemic strain caused high 
viral loads, dysregulated and pathogenic cell mediated 
immune responses, and transient increases in susceptibility 
to invasive bacterial infections. If such inﬂ  uenza virus–
infected hosts were subsequently exposed to bacterial 
strains to which they had no protective antibodies, they 
were at high risk of acquiring life-threatening secondary 
bacterial pneumonia.
The unique circumstances that enabled the 
unprecedented mortality rates of the 1918 pandemic no 
longer exist on a global scale. For example, in modern 
times, even the most isolated communities (e.g., Paciﬁ  c 
islanders, indigenous populations of North America, 
Australia, and New Zealand) are interconnected through 
myriad commercial and sociopolitical activities. As a result, 
most populations are exposed to annual seasonal inﬂ  uenza 
viruses, and most young adults are exposed to numerous 
viral and bacterial respiratory pathogens. Thus, compared 
with the situation in 1918, adults in modern communities 
have more diversiﬁ  ed immune repertoires against inﬂ  uenza 
strains and bacterial respiratory pathogens. The hypotheses 
presented may explain at least in part the relatively low 
mortality rate associated with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus. During the 2009 pandemic, many persons who died 
had underlying medical conditions, including obesity, 
asthma, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, and pregnancy; 
histopathologic changes consistent with diffuse alveolar 
damage; and evidence of bacterial co-infections. (40)
Finally, the ﬁ   ndings of this report are relevant to 
the research and development of a universal inﬂ  uenza 
vaccine. Candidate vaccines that contain antigens that are 
highly conserved across inﬂ  uenza A strains and strongly 
immunogenic must be closely monitored to ensure that 
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T-cell–mediated immune responses to future seasonal and 
pandemic strains are protective but not pathogenic.
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Whom are they affecting?
Why are they emerging now?
What can we do to prevent and 
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The International Conference on Emerging Infectious Dis-
eases was ﬁ  rst convened in 1998; ICEID 2012 marks its 
eighth occurence. The conference brings together public 
health professionals to encourage the exchange of scien-
tiﬁ  c and public health information on global emerging in-
fectious disease issues. The program will include plenary 
and panel sessions with invited speakers as well as oral 
and poster presentations on emerging infections. Major 
topics to be included are current work on surveillance, epi-
demiology, research, communication and training, bioter-
rorism, and prevention and control of emerging infectious 
diseases, both in the United States and abroad. 
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